Comparative Study of Federalism: U.S., India and Pakistan

Abstract

This article focuses on examining the intergovernmental relations of the US, India, and Pakistan, as well as their constitutions, finances, and the roles of power attained by the judiciary of every country. The study tackles the challenge of how effective a federal system is at balancing unity with diversity in governance within an ever-stable political context. A cross-sectional and diachronic study of federalism is conducted to dis–embed the evolution and operation of federalism in the three paradigmatically and historically different systems. The United States system is a fully developed system of cooperative federalism with constitutional and judicially defined boundaries. India has a constitutionally centralized system with cooperative frameworks that manage regional diversity and political pluralism. In contrast, Pakistan has a deeply troubled set of relations with its provinces that, even after the 18th Constitutional Amendment (2010), is best described as a federal system marked by considerable center dominance. The United States system is a fully developed system of cooperative federalism with constitutional and judicially defined boundaries, contrary to Pakistan. The analysis in this paper has shown that fiscal disparities permeate an entire political culture marked by cooperative federalism and considerable institutional strength, judicial impartiality and equity, and fiscal interdependence. This study ends with a set of conclusions intended to improve intergovernmental relations by fostering impartiality in the judiciary and increasing fiscal autonomy at the federal level. It again underscores the notion that federalism is still a working framework whose success depends on the ability of governments to work on mutual cooperative basis without inviting the chaos in the masses and always teaching them that they are the most deprived federating unit of the federation.